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Theory is a fancy word that sends most mortals rushing from the room convinced that 
what is coming is too rarefied, too pretentious, too difficult, or completely irrelevant. 
But I want to argue three things: first, that theory is very much intertwined with how 
we make sense of the world in an ordinary, day-to-day way; second, that we can gain 
something from being more systematic and probing about this activity of 'making 
sense'; and third, that feminists have made very good use, indeed, of this process. 
In their attempts to provide explanations for the ways in which sexual hierarchies 
are created and sustained as well as strategies for confronting them, feminists have 
produced an enormous, diverse, and eclectic set of interpretations. Taken together, 
they constitute an unprecedented historical challenge to the organization of social 
life, the categories through which that life previously has been apprehended, the ways 
in which sexual oppression informs and is informed by the many social practices 
through which people are privileged and disadvantaged, included and excluded, 
wield and submit to power. This literature in its diversity, internal debates, many 
languages, and complexity defies synthesis. Yet it is all provoked by unease with 
current social arrangements and my concern is that we not lose sight of its origins 
within feminist movements that seek to transform our relationships to each other on 
the intimate, local and global levels. This paper represents one feminist's attempt to 
delineate the contours of contemporary feminist theories, their relationship to each 
other, and to remind us of their collective indebtedness to past and present feminist 
movement including the movement to bring feminism to the academy. 
Let us begin then by examining the proposition that we all use theory and, further, 
that our lives would be well nigh impossible to live if we did not. In making decisions, 
in our interactions with others, in carrying out our activities we proceed on the basis 
of past experience and some form of conscious or unconscious speculation or 
prediction about the future. Through this process we provide ourselves with expla- 
nations about why things turned out as they did, and whether and how future outcomes 
will be similar or different. 
In such ways we navigate our way through our relationships with parents, friends, 
children, teachers, store clerks, employers, employees, as well as our way through 
what we have come to think of as bureaucratic red tape: applications for university, 
jobs and unemployment insurance, filing tax returns et cetera. We make decisions 
about whether to study or go to the movies, whether to start, continue, alter or end 
relationships, use contraception, terminate a pregnancy, have a child, cook a meal or 
eat out. We don't do all of this blindly, although we may often wonder why we did 
what we did. We know what will irritate our parents, and why; what will make our 
teenage children apoplectic and what will give them some reason to believe they are 
understood; we have some understanding of why there are deadlines for applications, 
and what kinds of marks or skills are needed for admission; when we approach the 
job market we have some idea of whether we will be offered a job and what sort. To 
make all these decisions we have at our disposal diverse sets of experience, informa- 
tion and interpretations ranging from ideas about why we and others behave as we 
do through to explanations about how goods, services and power are distributed in 
our society. 
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Often, however, we feel perplexed; we wish we knew more so that we could feel 
more confident about our decisions; often we may be uncomprehending about how 
people behave or how 'the system' works. In these situations we have choices: to 
allow the world to remain a mystery, to accept 'common sense' understandings that 
are readily available in our own milieu, or to engage in a more conscious and coherent 
process of observing, researching, reading, thinking, discussing and interpreting. If 
we choose this 'third way' we will encounter a body of literature - whether about 
the physical world, on power and politics, on human psychology, on bureaucracy, on 
the law, on ethics and morality, or on sexuality - that others have produced. The 
'answers' we find will always be tentative, and we may have to choose between very 
different answers or interpretations. Sometimes controversy will have given way to 
consensus. For a very long time people believed the world was flat; then some 
iconoclasts came along and made the perfectly ridiculous statement that the world 
was round. Imagine the surprise of those who once prosecuted these people as heretics 
if they were to find out that everyone, including present-day members of the same 
church that conducted the prosecutions, now believe that the earth is round. 
Sometimes you may ask a question that no one seems to have asked before. And 
if there haven't been any questions, then there will not be any answers. You may be 
a pioneer. More likely, however, some people will have asked the questions before, 
but they may not be the ones who wrote the books; they may not be those who were 
in a position to decide that they were 'good' questions. Further, those who are in a 
position to decide may have a good deal to gain if nobody asks those questions. They 
may even prosecute those who do as heretics, dissenters, or enemies of the state. As 
Gertrude Stein lay dying she apparently sat up suddenly and asked 'what is the 
answer?' When she received no answer she rose one last time to ask, 'what then is 
the question?' The key to viable and convincing answers is in the question. 
There is more to theory-making than asking, 'what is the question'? But it is a 
reasonable place to begin. Marx asked, 'what is the innermost secret of capitalism?' 
If people get paid for what they make, where do capitalists get their profit for further 
investment? The innermost secret, according to Marx, was that people do not get paid 
for what they produce. That is an assumption; it seems to be true, but it is not true. 
They actually get paid for selling their ability to labour - Marx called it labour power 
-to someone who owns the factory or the mine - 'the means of production' -for 
the going rate. Capitalists try to keep this wage as low as possible. Over time it can't 
fall below subsistence for working people as a whole, below what it takes to keep 
body and soul together, or there would be no more workers. Workers do what they 
can, through collective action, to raise it above subsistence. But regardless, workers 
will be paid for their ability to labour, what Marx called their labour power, not for 
what they have actually produced. 
This is the innermost secret of capitalism. Unravelling this secret formed an 
integral part of Marx's theoretical enterprise: his task was to understand how 
capitalism worked, what it was that brought workers together to resist exploitation, 
and how capitalism itself might be superseded by socialism. But the theory didn't 
just come out of his head. He studied history; he read what economists and philoso- 
phers had already written; he observed contemporary German, English and French 
society; he participated in politics; he read newspapers. People have been arguing 
about the viability of different aspects of his observations and predictions - his 
theory - ever since. But many agree that, at the very least, his questions took us a 
giant step forward in understanding our economic system and capitalist society. 
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So theory-writing (about human society) is about constructing informed interpre- 
tations of what has been, of how we arrived where we are, of the meaning this has 
for different participants and then, on that basis, attempting to draw informed 
predictions about the possible outcomes, and the consequences of each. This last will 
always be contingent for it will depend on what people choose to do; one writer 
referred to this as "the paradox of human agency."' This is to convey the idea that 
'what people choose to do' is never straightforward. We live in particular times and 
places and face varying sorts of constraint and possibility; even what we can imagine 
we would like to do is shaped by these circumstances. This may not seem like a 
contestable proposition. But this way of understanding the individual and society 
actually stands against the ideology of the rational, autonomous individual man that 
has dominated western thought in the past two or three centuries. These ideas are 
expressed in statements like 'any man [sic] can be President (Abe Lincoln: Log Cabin 
to president)' or 'we only have ourselves to blame for any misfortune from poverty 
to illness.' These ideas, with their origins in the Enlightenment and powerful 
adherents throughout this Age of Capitalism, have not, however, gone unopposed. 
Marx's challenge is encapsulated in the following famous passage: 
Men [sic] make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they 
do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances 
directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.' 
That is, we are born into particular -if always shifting - sets of relationships, within 
families and households, communities, and states. Such relationships confer obliga- 
tion and responsibility and shape access or lack of access to everything from 
economic resources and power and privilege to care and intimacy. 
Feminists have had different ways of conveying this important idea that we are 
born into particular arrangements which shape all aspects of our lives. Indeed, the 
question of who and what constrains, oppresses and subordinates women, and how, 
not only unites feminists but also divides them. 
Feminists and the Debate About Human Agency 
There are a proliferating and overlapping number of feminist perspectives. My 
intention is not to contribute to the drawing of firm boundaries between them - 
boundaries which may only imitate conventional disciplinary boundaries and make 
it more difficult to ask questions about the origins and sustaining of hierarchical 
relations between the sexes. Yet, for the student of women's studies it is necessary 
to know something about the nature and history of these differences. The labels have 
been used a good deal, and even if labels are increasingly abandoned, it is important 
to know what is being abandoned and why. 
Let us return to Marx's statement and see how feminists of differing persuasions 
- liberal feminists, socialist feminists, radical feminists, lesbian feminists, lesbian 
separatists, black feminists and feminists of colour - would elaborate, modify or 
overturn it. We have to consider also the ways in which feminists (who might also 
be in one or more of the above categories) have drawn on the insights of psychoanaly- 
sis, post-structuralism and linguistic theories in considering this question of (wo)men 
making their "own history but not under conditions chosen by themselves." 
1 Phiiip Abrams, Historical Sociology (Somerset 1982),xiii. 
2 Karl Marx,The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (New York 1963),15. 
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Liberal Feminism 
Feminism's history is intertwined with the individualistic ideology of liberalism. 
When Mary Wollstonecraft wrote A Vindication of the Rights of Women in 1792, she 
was in broad agreement with the liberal democratic slogan - Liberty, Equality, 
Fraternity - of the French Revolution. What she argued was that women too were 
rational beings with the potential to be fully responsible for their own lives. For her, 
and for the liberal feminists who came after her, including those of our own time, the 
circumstances that shaped women's lives were the laws and prejudices that excluded 
them from the public sphere. During the next two hundred years, with much ebb and 
flow, women struggledfor the right to higher education, entrance into theprofessions, 
the right to own property and hold public office and, of course, for suffrage, the right 
which came to symbolize full citizenship. For liberal feminists the laws that decreed 
that women were lesser beings than men were aproduct of ignorance. The expectation 
was that as men and women educated themselves on this subject, these laws and the 
prejudices that underwrote them would gradually be replaced by extending equality 
of opportunity to women as well. 
Embedded in Wollstonecraft's writings and in her personal biography are painful 
clues that this public road to emancipation might not be the whole story3 Pregnancy, 
childbirth and childcare both for themselves and for the perplexing obstacles they 
posed for economic independence, and the apparently unequal investment made by 
women and men in Iove: all this seems in retrospect to undercut the rationality and 
linear progress towards equality suggested by Wollstonecraft's liberalism. These 
fragmentary aspects of her thought moved to centre-stage in later feminist thought. 
Marxism and the Woman Question 
The issue of economic independence figures prominently in Marx and Engels' theory 
on 'the woman question.' They were the first to offer a systematic explanation for 
the sexual hierarchy that was linked to the means for its transcendence. Engels argued 
that our early ancestors lived in a state of primitive communism: everyone had to 
labour to survive and all that was available was shared. With their invention of animal 
husbandry and cultivation, they created the possibility of accumulating surplus. This 
was of monumental importance in human history. It opened up the possibility of 
longer, more secure lives. But the underside of this development was that this surplus 
could be controlled by some and used in the interests of the few against the many. 
The surplus would be claimed by the few as their 'Private property.' Some would 
labour so that others might prosper. Those men with a surplus wanted their 'own' 
children to inherit the wealth they had amassed. But how would men know who were 
their 'own' children? Only women have this assurance. The 'solution' was to turn 
women themselves into private property. If a man 'owned' a woman, she would 
labour for him, and she would only have sexual relations with him. Thus the idea of 
'legitimacy' was born. Legitimacy means that a man's child is the child of 'his' wife. 
In this interpretation, class society and male dominance enter onto the world stage 
together. For Engels these developments constituted the "world historic defeat of the 
3 Zillah Eisenstein, The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism (Boston 1981); Ann Snitow,"A Gender 
Diary," in Mariame Hirsch and Evelyn Fox Keller, Conflicts in Feminism (New York, 1990; Rosalyn 
A. Sydie "From Liberal to Radical: the Work and Life of Mary Wollstonecraft," At lantis, 17 (Autumn 
1991). 
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female sex."4 It followed, then, that with the abolition of private property (under 
communism), women would be emancipated. A first step towards this under capital- 
ism was equality between working-class women and men, as economic desperation 
forced women also to become wage labourers - and hence economically inde- 
pendent. For mamists, then, the "circurnstances" which shape women's lives are the 
relations of private property, and in our era, therefore, capitalist relations. They are 
the same relations that shape the lives of men, albeit, as we saw, in different ways. 
Historically then, liberal feminism and the marxist perspective on 'the woman 
question' not only had different explanations for, and solutions to, the subordination 
of women but also they occupied different, and sometimes hostile political territory. 
Marxists accused feminists of being 'bourgeois,' and potentially dangerous to the 
working class because sex-specific ideas about oppression would pit working men 
and women against each other, on the one hand, and might create (false) grounds for 
'class collaboration' between upper and working class women on the other. Femi- 
nists, for their part, often accused left-wing men and their political parties of being 
as disinterested - if not as hostile - as their class enemies to the rights of women. 
Not until the late 1960s did another feminism develop which put liberal feminism 
and the marxist perspective on 'the woman question' into dialogue with each other 
and made fully visible the hitherto unexplored fragments in Wollstonecraft's writ- 
ings. For this feminism launched a critique not only of the public world but also of 
the private world - the world of family, love, sexuality, pregnancy and childcare. 
Furthermore, these feminists argued that it was the interconnections between public 
and private worlds that were pivotal for understanding the sexual hierarchy. Women's 
liberation, therefore, depended upon the transformation of both. 
But these second-wave feminists soon divided along political and theoretical lines 
into those calling themselves socialist feminist and those calling themselves radical 
feminist. For the purpose of this discussion the difference between them centred upon 
the question of explanation: who and what oppressed women and why. 
Socialist Feminism 
Socialist feminists argued, with marxists, that the relations of capital, and therefore 
class relations, were pivotal. But they differed from mamists in insisting that the 
oppressive relations between the sexes were not simply derivative of class, and that, 
therefore, the interconnections between sex oppression and class exploitation had to 
be addressed. In other words, for socialist feminists, it was no longer enough to talk 
about 'the woman question,' and they did not assume that the basis for women's 
oppression would disappear automatically with the overthrow of capitalism. These 
feminists focused upon the ways in which the labour done by women in the household 
-which they called domestic labour - helped sustain the capitalist system. On both 
a daily and generational level women contributed to the reproduction of labour power 
by having and rearing children and by looking after husbands between their wearying 
days (or nights) in mines and factorie~.~ As a result, both capitalists and individual 
men benefited from the unpaid and personal service of women in the home. 
Socialist feminists analyzed the interconnections between the public sphere of 
capitalist and state relations and the private sphere of the farnily/household. Not only 
4 FrederickEngels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (New York 1942), 57. 
5 Pat Armstrong and Hugh Amstrong, The Double Ghetto: Canadian Women and their Segregated 
Work (Toronto 1984); Meg Luxton, More than a Labour of Love (Toronto 1980). 
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did the complex range of tasks done in the home prop up the capitalist edifice and 
allow the system to function at a fraction of its 'real' cost, but in many ways the 
appearance of the distinction between private and public created and sustained the 
unequal relations between men and women throughout the society. Challenging the 
dominant interpretation, 'man in the work force bringing home the bacon, nurturing 
woman at home providing sustenance,' socialist feminists uncovered the historically 
specific development of this relationship during the rise of industrial capitalism. Men 
of capital together with middle-class social workers, and the better-paid male skilled 
workers worked in diverse, but mutually reinforcing ways to push women out of the 
labour force with promises of a 'family wage' for male workers. For women, the 
results of this long historical manoeuvre had been doubly exploitative and oppressive. 
Denied access to higher education and the professions, women were also pushed out 
of the better-paying jobs; the worst paid, and least protected jobs remained 'open' to 
them. Second, most men never earned a 'family wage' but were nonetheless expected 
to support a wife and children. Women compensated for inadequate wages by 
increasing household labour, taking in boarders, laundry and other people's children, 
and putting the needs of others before their own. Third, men earned the (main) wage 
and this relative privilege reinforced their power over their wives and children. Men 
were exploited in the work force, and they responded by flexing their muscles, 
literally and figuratively, at home. If they stayed at home. 
Socialist feminists pointed to the final irony that when men deserted, as they often 
did, women, encouraged from birth to believe that men would care for them and their 
children, had to earn a living in the capitalist marketplace with "one hand tied behind 
their back" - no marketable skills, denied access to education, shut out of better- 
paying jobs, and with no social supports for child care. The family wage, portrayed 
as a form of security for working-class people, was unmasked as a fraud. Primarily 
the idea of family wage functioned as a rationale for excluding women from 
better-paying jobs and secure incomes, for paying them less, hiring them last and 
firing them first, and as a justification for women's sole responsibility for childcare 
and housework coupled with a lifetime of personal service to a particular man. No 
wonder that sociologists and socialist feminists Pat and Hugh Armstrong wanted to 
call The Double Ghetto (their path-breaking book on women's work in Canada) 
Everyone Needs a Wife. 
During the 1970s, socialist feminism developed through heated debates and open 
dialogue with radical feminism, quickly taking on board many of its insights, while 
eschewing many of its explanations. 
Radical Feminism 
Radical feminists did not dispute the exploitative nature of capitalist relations but 
they argued that, buried deeper in human society, both historically and psychically, 
were the relations of domination and subordination between the sexes. Writing at the 
dawn of the contemporary women's movement, Shulamith Firestone located these 
differences between men and women in 'nature's' unequal allotment of reproductive 
tasks. Women bore, suckled and raised children, while men had the time and 
opportunity to develop social institutions - including the 'family' -through which 
they were able to appropriate power and control over women and childrem6 The 
6 Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex (New York 1970) 
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bottom line was that men oppressed women, and overthrowing that oppression 
constituted the primary struggle in which feminists should engage. 
Radical feminism was neither static nor monolithic however. As the critique 
developed many radical feminists began to locate men's power over women in their 
ability to control women sexually, and to develop the institutions which ensure 
continuing controL7 Adrienne Rich coined the famous phrase 'compulsory hetero- 
sexuality' to encapsulate all those social and cultural imperatives that closed off all 
sexual options for women except monogamous heterosexual permanent coupling - 
usually called marriage.8 In a world of unequal power relations between men and 
women, compulsory heterosexuality ensured not only women's sexual dependence 
upon men but also their economic, social and psychological dependence. From this 
perspective - sometimes called lesbian feminism, though it was by no means 
confined to lesbians - women's lives in patriarchal society were shaped by the 
myriad legal institutions and cultural messages that enjoined women (from the time 
they were young girls) to look to men for sexual satisfaction, personal validation, and 
life-long companionship, and to accept their subordination to men in general and their 
husbands in particular as part of the ' b ~ g a i n . ' ~  From this critical position some 
lesbian feminists took the short but dramatic step to a lesbian separatist position that 
women should no longer try to change the whole society but rather find ways to live 
apart from men and build the new society alone. 
More generally, early radical feminism was eclipsed by what has been called 
cultural feminism - overlapping with, but not confined by a separatist perspective."' 
Women should build their own institutions from health clinics to women's shelters, 
to small businesses, art galleries, publishing houses, and magazines. The rationale 
for these developments varied widely: for some it was a way of building apermanent 
women's world; for others it was a refuge from the pain of day-to-day struggle with 
men; for others such autonomous organizing was intended to build a power base from 
which the whole society could be transformed. 
What is key for the discussion on human agency is that radical, lesbian and cultural 
feminists argued that women are 'born into' arrangements which forced them to live 
their lives in subservience to men. These feminists might alter Marx's statement to 
something like: Men make their own history; women have no history of their own. 
Socialist feminists agree that most men of all social classes have the opportunity in 
both their intimate and work lives to dominate and oppress women. Yet they also 
argue that men's and women's lives are shaped by the relations of capital, relations 
which privilege a few at the expense of the many. 
Anti-racist Ferninisms 
Women of colour and black feminists led the way in insisting that liberal, socialist 
and radical feminists failed to identify the key circumstances produced by racism that 
shape our lives: that is, racism produces lives of privilege for some and brutal 
oppression and exploitation for others. For these feminists, an understanding of what 
shapes women's lives must intertwine an analysis of racism with the Marxist focus 
on class and the radical feminist focus upon the sexual hierarchy: "[tlhe circum- 
7 Hester Eisenstein, Contemporary Feminist Thought (London 1984). 
8 A d r i e ~ e  Rich, "Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence," Signs (Summer 1980). 
9 See Resources for Feminist Research (Sept-Dec 1990). 
10 Alice Echols, Daring to be Bad: Radical Feminism in America 1967-1975 (Minneapolis 1989). 
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stances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past" must include 
centrally those relations that are the living legacy of colonialism, imperialism, and 
slavery. Furthermore, they have argued - in opposition to the radical feminist 
perspective on sexual hierarchy - that while these relations of racism shaped the 
lives of men and women differently, they did not always or necessarily privilege men 
over women1 ' 
This challenge initially seemed to create irreconcilable differences among femi- 
nists. Michkle Barrett, for example, argued that the argument that racism must have 
'equal billing' with class and sex dislodged the claim of socialist feminists to have a 
coherent theory of inequality. 
[Elxisting theories of social structure, already taxed by attempting to think about the 
inter-relations of class and gender, have been quite unable to integrate a third axis of 
systemic inequality into their conceptual maps." 
Yet the response to anti-racist feminisms has been taken up by feminists from across 
the spectrum who have redrawn their theoretical perspectives and political agendas. 
For example, by looking at the lives of men and women in particular historical and 
social contexts, some feminists have abandoned the question of whether class, race, 
or sex is the more salient relation for analysis in favour of understanding the historical 
specificity of complex relations of power.13 
Feminism and Psychoanalysis 
Some feminists have turned to psychoanalytic theories to explain how resolutely we 
are "born into" particular  arrangement^.'^ Starting from Freud's assertion that 
"women are made, not born," the focus here is upon how infants become gendered, 
how their sexual preference is shaped, and how they take their place within the 
hierarchical gendered order. What is particularly pertinent here is how we come to 
feel ourselves to be men or women as an intrinsic part of our being; this means that 
we are not just forced to be dominant or submissive, but that we are complicit in our 
subordination; we collaborate because it feels more comfortable than it would to 
resist. To put it more strongly, women who resist feel anxiety and therefore guilt, and 
women who resist make men feel anxious about their 'masculinity .'l5 
Freud's emphasis was upon the key role played by the Oedipus complex in the 
making of male identity. Little boys take their mothers (because they are the primary 
caregivers) as their first love object. When they realize unconsciously that these 
feelings bring them into potential conflict with their fathers, they experience great 
anxiety - castration anxiety -that their stronger and more powerful fathers will do 
them some injury for daring to compete with them. In the typical Freudian formula- 
tion, the small boy gives up his love for his mother, incorporates his father's standards 
within himself (the superego) and is 'bought off,' if you like, by the promise of a 
11 bell hooks, Talking Back: Talking Feminist Talking Black (Toronto 1988); Audre Lorde, Sister 
Outsider (Trumansburg, New York 1984); Feminist Review 20,22,23; Makeda Silvera, Fireworks: 
The Best ofFireweed (Toronto 1986); Patricia Williams, The Alchemy ofRace mdRights (Cambridge 
199 1). 
12 Michhle Barrett, Women's Oppression Today (London 1988), xii. 
13 Nancy Adamson, Linda Briskin and Margaret McPhail, Feminist Organizing for Change (Toronto 
1988). 
14 See the Review Essays "Psychoanalysis and Feminism: Current Controversies," Signs (Winter 1992), 
435-466. 
15 Jessica Benjamin, The Bonds of Love (New York 1988). 
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woman of his own when he grows up. Freud was much less sure about what happened 
to the girl child during this period but, nonetheless, he came to believe that little girls 
also have their first love affair with their mother.I6 They soon realize, however, that 
they cannot possess the mother because they lack the necessary organ - the penis; 
hence Freud'sfamous -even notorious -insistence that women's identity is shaped 
profoundly by penis envy. 
Feminists working with the insights of psychoanalysis have not simply accepted 
Freud's formulations. Rather, they have situated them within a societal context which 
announces to girl and boy children alike that one needs a penis to have power in a 
patriarchal world. They argue that all children will desire everything-penis, breasts, 
to have a baby (a wish often expressed by boy children as well as girl children). Only 
in a patriarchal world will the desire for a penis become overvalued, and the desire 
for breasts and pregnancy become undervalued." 
Some feminists - following the work of French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan - 
have located the formation of masculine and feminine identities not in the process of 
bodily maturation and Oedipal complexes, but in the child's introduction to what 
Lacan called the Symbolic Order.18 This symbolic order includes language - for 
words are the symbols through which we name everything around us, and perhaps 
the most important way in which we communicate with others. What conveys power 
in this Symbolic Order is not the penis as such but rather its symbol, the Phallus. For 
the boy child the Phallus represents the power that he comes to realize will accrue to 
him because he is male; the girl child's identity is designated by the boy child (and 
by her) by 'what she lacks.' What is important here is that there is no 'essential' 
meaning or power attached to maleness. Rather this power is defined and conveyed 
by the whole system of discourse in a society - that is, the language, gestures and 
all the symbols that convey power for some and lack of power for others. For example, 
if a father has a special chair in the living room that is bigger and more comfortable 
than anyone else's including the mothers's, this is not lost on the child; this is part of 
the 'discourse' that defines not only the hierarchy of male-female power but also 
introduces the child to hislher own place in this order. 
Discourse Analy sis 
Lacan's ideas have been extremely influential, in part because they merge with those 
of some other major late twentieth-century theorists in highlighting the importance 
of discourse in not only creating human societies, but in providing whatever access 
we can have to discussing or understanding society. But these 'discourses,' which 
include but are not restricted to language, do not tell us 'the truth' about the world. 
For they are thoroughly informed not only by prevailing power relations -of class, 
race, sex, age, heterosexism - but also by a kind of common-sense rationale for 
accepting those power relations as given - the only way things could be.'' 
This discourse also provides the means for constructing our own identities - 
identities which are not 'fixed' as in the expression 'the real me' but rather are 
fragmented, changing, and contradictory. Freud argued that our psyches are a kind 
16 Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures (New York 1965). 
17 Gad Horowitz, Repression: Basic and Surplus Repression inpsychoa~iytic Theory (Toronto 1977); 
Roberta Hamilton, "The Collusion with Patriarchy: A Psychoanalytic Account," in R. Hamilton and 
M. Barrett (eds.), The Politics of Diversity: Feminism, Marxism and Nationalism (London 1986). 
18 Juliet Mitchell, Psychmnalysis and Feminism: Freud Reich, Laing and Women (New York 1974). 
19 Catherine Belsey, Critical Practice (London and New York 1980). 
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of life-long battle ground between the id, ego and superego - between need, desire, 
possibility and conscience. These more recent theories of discourse accept this idea 
of the fragmented self. But they shift the ground for explanation away from the body 
as such to the way that the body -including need and desire - is constituted by the 
discourse, again as a lifelong, fragmented, contradictory, illusory process. Why 
illusory? Because discourse can never capture 'reality.' This would be an impossible 
task for two related reasons. First the terms of a discourse are always time-bound, 
space-bound, culture-bound - bound by the multiplicities of power relations that 
inform daily life. Second, there is no 'pure' reality outside of what is represented in 
discourse. There is no 'something' outside of that which is already interpreted - 
except that which is to be interpreted in some future moment. In this sense, discourse 
does not represent reality; it shapes and creates that-which-is-believed-to-be reality. 
Central to understanding how this works is to understand the role of language. 
Words do not simply describe or identify. Words make distinctions and create 
oppositions. They tell us what is encompassed in a symbol and, by implication, what 
is not. Think of the words 'hot' and 'cold.' The very words structure how we describe 
everything from soup to sex. Yet, as we know, temperature comes on a continuum, 
and 'hot' and 'cold' are always relative. Hot and cold, when applied to sexual activity, 
carry with them the connotation of lust and evil that have so informed western 
civilization and the presumed identities of men and women. Medieval Catholic 
writers depicted women as full-of-lust waiting to tempt unsuspecting men into a life 
of sin. Later Protestants writers developed a language about women that described 
them as asexual; it was men who had to control their own lust. Thus a discourse that 
uses opposing concepts like hot and cold, rational and irrational (emotional), or 
aggressive and passive, depicts men and women as either one way OR the other, and 
ignores all the points on the continuum that are in between. 
Some feminists have drawn upon this critique of the binary oppositions of 
language to expand upon the idea of fragmented and shifting identities. Our language 
helps create the sense that our identities are not only fixed, but gender-determined. 
When feminists deconstruct this language they open the space for consideration of 
identities that are not bound by biological sex - or race, age, sexuality or ethnicity 
or any other category that we use to fix and freeze identities. If we come back to the 
Lacanian idea that woman is defined by what she lacks -that is by what is not male 
- we can see how this works more generally at the level of language. The binary 
categories of language define the world in terms of oppositions. Language is like that. 
If we say something is 'beautiful' we are implicitly comparing it to something-that- 
is-not beautiful. 
Women are what men are not: if we say 'men are aggressive' we are comparing 
them directly and indirectly to those - women - who are not; in like manner, if 
men are rational, women are irrational; if men independent, women are dependent. 
The point is not that men and women 'really' are this way, although in particular 
times and places they may behave so or they may be believed to be so. Again, let us 
reiterate, that the discourse does not convey 'reality'; rather it constitutes what 
appears to be reality. Furthermore, women who are not perceived to be passive and 
emotional may be defined as 'not real women' and men who are not perceived to be 
aggressive may be called effeminate! In such ways the discourse permits acknow- 
ledgement that men and women do not always conform to these oppositions. But the 
point is that this acknowledgement is made only in the terms of the discourse itself: 
the categories are retained but the individual people are labelled as deviants. In this 
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sense we can speak of discourses as 'closed systems'; they make thought difficult 
which is not consonant with itself. 
Using this kind of analysis, feminists have argued that identities are not fixed, but 
rather are constructed continually in particular times and places. Nor are they unified 
but rather fragmented - in some circumstances we feel ourselves to be strong and 
powerful, in others weak and fragile, in others perhaps creative, stupid, lackadaisical, 
determined - the list is yours to make and remake. If this is so, the argument goes, 
how can we then talk about women and men as if these categories mean something 
that we can all agree upon? This kind of analysis which explores the ways in which 
language constructs thought has been called post-structuralism. 
Feminism and Post-Structuralism 
For feminist post-structuralists the task has been to 
... unmake the chain of binary oppositions - masculine/feminine, marketlnon-mar- 
ket, publiciprivate, wagedinon-waged - and rethink the categoricalism that canton- 
izes gender, class, race, ethnicity and nationality, so as to see past the conceptual 
signage, which has illuminated the previously invisible but now threatens to obsb-uct 
our view of the living space beyond.20 
The argument in this excerpt from Joy Parr's The Gender of Breadwinners is 
two-pronged. She acknowledges that it was necessary for feminists to use the 
category 'woman' in order to notice that previous 'knowledge' had been all about 
men and to initiate the process through which women would be included. Women 
had been invisible -present only in what was left unexamined, unexplored, unstated. 
But this process of 'making visible' must not simply recapitulate the pattern of 
androcentric perspectives and continue to use these categories - men and women 
- as though they really described the world. 
For by doing this, we fall into two errors. First we perpetuate the categories of the 
discourse that once left us invisible. We refer to women and men as ifwe knew what 
they were and we perpetuate the appositional character of those identities. Women 
still are defined by what men are not -even though we may now place more value 
on 'what men are not.' Second, we assume that when we use the word 'woman' we 
are referring to all women; we collapse the differences among women that accrue 
from class, racism, heterosexism, imperialism, even the idiosyncrasies of taste and 
talent. In this way the theoretical challenges to second-wave feminism from women 
of colour, black women, disabled women, lesbians, bisexuals, and older women 
converged with those of post-structuralism. The command is 'do not tell me what I 
am. ' 
How, then, might feminist post-structuralists respond to the issue of human 
agency, and in particular to Marx's statement that we make our history "under 
circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past"? The 
difference from Marx could be located in the definition post-structuralists might give 
to "circumstances": they want to look at the process through which the categories of 
malelfemale, blacklwhite, workthome, publiclprivate are constituted in time and 
place, and how those categories, as  they are defined at any particular time, contribute 
to the range of possibility and constraint. Furthermore, unlike Marx and most 
20 Joy Parr. The Gender o f  Breadwinners: Women, Men and Change in Two Indu~trial Towns 1880-1950 
(Toronto 1990), 8. 
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feminists before them, they argue that the ways in which male and female are defined 
are also implicated in all other categorization - whether of class, race, sexual 
preference, etc. How, for example, has 'working-class' as a category in the language 
informed shifting definitions of masculinity, and through inclusion and exclusion, 
shifting definitions of femininity? At the same time, how are gender definitions 
infused by notions of class? 
Language appears 'innocent,' in that it appears simply as an instrument through 
which our ideas can be expressed. Students often express this with the statement "I 
know what I think but I just can't get it down on paper." But let us take a familiar 
example to see how language does not express our preexisting thought, but actually 
shapes that thought. The term 'working mother' has come into the language in the 
last twenty years with the great influx into the formal waged economy of women who 
have children. Embedded in the phrase, implicitly, are a whole host of shifting, 
value-laden gendered and classed characters. Counterposed to 'working mothers' are 
'women who don't work' (and who just keep house and look after children), and the 
victims of working mothers, 'neglected children' (those whose mothers do not 'just' 
look after them). Implicit in the phrase 'working mothers' are also a cast of male 
characters. Whoever heard of a 'working father' or achild who was neglected because 
his father worked? 'Working mother' can also designate those women who take jobs 
away from men - contributing to the category therefore of 'unemployed men' - 
fathers who don't work and therefore are, by definition, 'bad fathers.' Furthermore, 
'working mother' is more likely to be used with reference to women who do certain 
kinds of 'class-related' occupations that have relatively low monetary rewards and 
little status. Women who work in other sorts of 'class-related' occupations may be 
defined as 'professionals' rather than 'working mothers.' Here we see the operation 
of a kind of implicit 'override clause': sometimes gender terms take precedence, other 
times class terms, or racist terms, or terms referring to women's sexual lives. 
Words do not just say what they appear to say; they carry and create shifting 
identities, possibilities and constraints. Joy Parr's description of gendered identities 
during a 1949 garment workers' strike in Paris, Ontario captures the feminist 
post-structuralist perspective: "gendered identities were masks that changed in the 
shifting light and shadow of the dispute - mercurial, unpredictable in the effects 
upon public ~ympathy."~' 
Feminist Theories and Social Change 
These theories about human society are also, explicitly or implicitly, theories about 
the possibilities for social transformation and, in particular, of emancipation for those 
subordinate, oppressed, exploited and excluded. Indeed, these theories play a role in 
producing or complicating their own predictions about the future. For when theories 
present ideas which confirm peoples' sense of grievance, they also help to legitimate 
their resistance. For example, Marx's theories provided people throughout the world 
with an ideological legitimation to engage in revolutions. Catholics in Latin America 
intertwined their religious beliefs with an understanding of Marxism to argue that the 
Church should be on the side of the oppressed in this life -what has been called 'the 
preferential option of the poor.'" This complex set of beliefs - called liberation 
theology contributed to widespread forms of social protest as a new generation of 
21 Ibid., 113. 
22 Gregory Baum, Liberation Theology und Marxism (Montreal 1986). 
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Church workers challenged the Church's age-old admonition that entrance into 
heaven depended upon acceptance upon the hierarchy of this world. While few 
theories - perhaps none - have unsettled the powerful as much as marxism, 
feminism arguably is running a close second. As women the world over increasingly 
question their subordination, victimization and exclusion they appropriate, revise and 
develop theoretical perspectives to legitimate their struggles. 
The question is this: do some feminist theories understand the world in ways that 
trifle or negate the role of conscious human intervention - agency - in bringing 
about social change? Marxist theory argues that the working class has the potential 
to become a conscious agent of liberation. The initial site for the development of a 
shared consciousness of exploitation is the point of production - that is, the 
workplace. But socialist feminists have argued that women's collective and specific 
oppression is located in the private sphere, and in the inter-relationship between 
private and public. This suggests that marxism, left to its 'own devices,' does not 
provide sufficient legitimation, let alone an adequate strategy, for the 'rising of the 
women.'23 Socialist feminists insist that women organize around their own interests 
in the workplace and that their demands address their interests as mothers and wives 
as well as their interests as waged workers. This involves a critique not only of 
relations between workers and employers but also of the relations between men and 
women in both public and intimate spaces. 
Some radical feminist theorists draw such an unyielding account of women's 
subordination and victimization that they have difficulty explaining how women ever 
came to resist including, ironically, how the women's movement itself could ever 
have mobilized. Where was the space for the development of rebellious ideas, let 
alone the possibility for acting upon them? In a similar way, those feminists who have 
drawn upon, elaborated and critiqued Lacan's idea of the child's linguistic entrance 
into Symbolic Order seem, at times, to create a closed system, impervious to change. 
Luce Irigaray has argued that women are excluded from the discourse of the symbolic 
order. If we are to glimpse what women think or feel we must attend to the silences 
in their discourse, to the ways in which they may parody what men say - indeed as 
a theorist she repeats what male theorists have written, playing on their words to make 
her subtle point. From this perspective we may have access to what women imagine, 
but even these triumphs ofimagination are, necessarily, entangled within masculine 
Does such a perspective leave a space for women's resistance? 
Feminist post-structuralists have also been accused by other feminists of pulling 
the rug out from under the women's m~vernent.'~ If identities are fractured, if ideas 
of 'women' and 'men' must be deconstructed rather than accepted as given, what are 
the grounds for feminist movement? If people are going to mobilize politically, they 
have to mobilize around or about something. In the women's movement the mobili- 
zation has been - it sounds self-evident to say it - around and about and for women. 
What happens when the rallying cries about women's oppression, their common 
interests and needs, indeed, their victimization are invalidated? 
23 Meredith Tax, The Rising of Women (New York 1980). 
24 Maggie Berg, "Luce Irigary 'Contradictions': Post-Structuralism and Feminism," Signs (Autumn 
199 1). 
25 Somer Brodribb, A Feminist Critique of Postmodemism (North Melbourne 1992); Nancy Harstock, 
"Foucault and Power: A Theory for Women?" in Linda Nicholson (ed.), Feminism/Postmodernism 
(New York and London 1990); Tania Modleski, Feminism Without Women: Culture and Criticism in 
a Post-feminist' Age (New York 1991). 
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Although recent theoretical developments informed by post-structuralism and post 
modernism challenge the concept of 'identity' and therefore 'woman' in ways which 
appear, to some others, to shake the foundations for women's movement, the 
questions about 'what a woman is' informs older perspectives as well. That is, the 
disjunction between many renditions of liberal, radical and socialist feminisms and 
their poststructuralist critics has been overstated by those on both sides of the debate. 
For the category 'woman'- what she is and what she should do - lies at the heart 
of most feminist analysis, albeit in different ways. Liberal feminists, dating back to 
Mary Wollstonecraft, argued that if women appeared less rational, less interested in 
the world, less given to philosophical thought and political activity, the explanation 
resided in the ways in which women were denied the opportunity for education. 
Women would be as 'rational' as some men (and as irrational as some others), if they 
were treated similarly in social terms. The 'essence' of woman, no more than man 
was to be found in their genetic makeup, their biology or their reproductive capacities. 
In the terms of the time, therefore, Wollstonecraft challenged the category 'woman' 
and, also, although less systematically, the category 'man' as well. For men, Woll- 
stonecraft lamented, were disappointing in their inattention to love and the emotional 
life. Contemporary liberal feminists argue that there are no tasks in the public sphere 
- including armed combat roles in the military - for which women are unsuitable. 
At the same time they have argued for parental leave for fathers after birth, adoption, 
and in the case of children's illness. To the extent that we are defined by what we do, 
and what we have the capacity to do, therefore, liberal feminists have challenged 
dominant notions about women and men. Far from being discrete categories, women 
and men are more likely to overlap in their motivations, goals, and talents. 
Socialist feminists went further than liberal feminists in challenging the concept 
'woman' as a universal category. Following Man  they argue that the consciousness 
of human beings reflects the activities in which they engage and the accompanying 
relationships they create. Women in different historical periods and different social 
classes not only are different from each other, but in some respects share more with 
the men of their time and station than they do with other women. Furthermore, by 
analyzing the interconnections between the private and public sphere, through 
revealing and challenging the attempts to relegate women to the first, insisting that 
the tasks done in the household constituted "more than a labour of love," and by 
renaming that activity 'domestic labour' or 'work' socialist feminists challenged the 
dominant ideas that held that male and female nature and identities were discrete. 
Early radical feminists like Shulamith Firestone argued that the differences 
between men and women resided only in their different roles in reproduction. While 
these differences had been crucial in creating social inequality, increasing control 
over pregnancy and birth as well as the promise of reproductive technology could 
(and should) eliminate the social consequences of these differences. The categories 
'woman' and 'man' would cease to matter after the 'socialist feminist revolution.' 
Some later radical feminists do reclaim the category 'woman,' suggesting that she 
possesses certain qualities and attributes that distinguish her in important and irrec- 
oncilable ways from men. At the same time, however, many radical feminist analysis 
increasingly address the question of diversity among women - diversity resulting 
from racism, age, ethnicity, religious conviction and sexuality. 
Some of the most trenchant criticisms of the assumption that there is a category 
'woman' that may be used in theoretical discussions and political mobilization come 
from women of colour in the fist world, and women in non-western societies. Their 
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analyses expose the chasms between dominant ideologies about 'women' and the 
lives that women lead, the assumptions of white feminists about female exploitation 
and oppression, and the centrality of racism, first-world imperialism, and cultural 
specificity in structuring their lives as women. In such ways they have challenged 
any attempt to universalize the category 'woman' and to counterpose the category 
'woman' to 'man.' Paradoxically however - paralleling the air-tight categories 
'men' and 'women' created by some radical feminists, some of these writers produce 
discrete racialized identities of their own - categories of white and black, women 
of colour and white women. The title Black Feminist Thought suggests another 
category 'white feminist thought.' But most of these writers have an explicit goal: to 
challenge racism and the ways in which racism creates hierarchical categories 'white' 
and 'black.' In the challenges to white feminists to confront their own racism, they 
insist that identities based on racial difference are politically and socially created. 
Furthermore, by looking at the ways in which racism and multi-national capitalisms 
informs people's lives, they also breakdown any sense of discrete categories of 'man' 
and 'woman.' 
Seen in this light, the feminist post-structuralist assault on the concept of fixed 
'identity' of any sort - womanlman, whitelblack, straightlgay - does not go against 
the grain of most previous feminist analysis. When Denise Riley says at the end of 
"Am I that Name?' that there are times when we need to mobilize "as if' there were 
women she puts into words an implicit assumption underlying much previous 
feminist analysis and action: women should not be defined by their biology; their life 
chances should not be defined by their relationships to men; the social constraints 
that have been legitimated by biological difference from men - whether women's 
size and physical strength, their role in reproduction, their capacity to bear children 
- must be challenged. All this suggests - in line with Riley and other feminist 
poststructuralists - that human beings will be defined and will define themselves 
less than previously by ascribed characteristics of sex. 
All this suggests that the debate about 'identity' between those employing the 
methods of post-structuralism and other feminists is more contrived than real. Yet 
that is not the whole story. Post-structuralism offers a critique of the concept 
'identity,' subject and subjectivity that challenges previous feminist assumptions. For 
post-structuralism, identities are not the properties of human beings, as such, but 
rather they are animated within and through discourses. The focus of analysis shifts 
from 'the subject in history' and the relationships between them to an analysis of the 
discourse. This involves attending to how the structure of language informs thought 
and constructs identities. Not only what is said, but what is not said; not just what is 
said but how it is said; not just what can be said but that which cannot be said: this is 
what constitutes the focus for post-structuralist analysis. Identities, therefore, are 
never fixed, but are always shifting and fragmented. When Riley critiques the subject 
'woman' in history, it is in the context of a perspective which dislodged the very 
concept 'subject' from a privileged place in social analysis. 
There are clearly tensions here. If the portrait of female subordination is painted 
in unequivocal terms, there is no way to explain or, indeed, hope for transformation. 
If, on the other hand, female identity across culture, time, space, situation, even 
moment-to-moment is completely contingent, what are the grounds or purposes of a 
women's m~vement?'~ 
26 Denise Riley, 'Am I that Name?': Feminism and the Category of Women in History (Minneapolis, 
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This question - about the grounds and purposes for women's movements - is 
apoignant one for feminist scholars. For theremarkable and exponential development 
of feminist scholarship, perspectives, theories, and creative writing in the last twenty- 
five years originates with the questions, demands and goals of the contemporary 
women's movement. Understanding this important convergence is also a theoreti- 
cal/historical undertaking. In seeking answers, feminists have taken up the question 
of the 'origins' of the gender hierarchies - not just the contemporary 'causes' and 
questions about "in whose interest" such hierarchies are sustained - but also 
questions about 'in the beginning' origins. How contingent are the categories 'men' 
and 'women'? To what extefit do they encapsulate and describe biological and 
sociological 'realities'? How do we begin to answer those who claim that feminists 
are tampering with the laws of God and nature when they critique and seek to 
transform the relations between men and women? How serious a challenge to hitherto 
existing, androcentric 'knowledge' do feminists pose? 
'Origins' of Gender Hierarchy 
In seeking to explain the pervasiveness, and therefore the origins of female subordi- 
nation, feminists confront vast multicultural, theological, biological, archeological, 
and anthropological literatures which assume and justify gender hierarchy in terms 
of biological differences, sexual temperaments, divine ordinance, and natural 'pro- 
clivities.' The argument about biological difference has been the most difficult 
because such differences seem to be irreducibly 'natural.' Indeed, a challenge to 
biological difference has often appeared ridiculous, a joke guaranteed to elicit 
laughter. In their practices and claims to domination, men appeared to have nature 
on their side. While that assumption was once much easier to make, it is not without 
its vocal proponents today, both among the powerful and those with little power, and 
among men and women. 
Physical Size and Male Bonding 
Let us look then at two different kinds of biological arguments - or rationalizations 
- for gender hierarchy that continue to enjoy broad consensus. On average, and in 
any particular society, men are bigger and physically stronger. This has led to a set 
of explanations which have insisted that men are more aggressive, and even that they 
have been genetically programmed to act collectively - through what has been called 
male bonding - in order to impose their will on women. Lionel Tiger is perhaps the 
best known spokesperson of this position which, at times, appears strikingly disin- 
genuous: even if women want to become political leaders they cannot "because males 
are strongly predisposed to form and maintain all-male groups, particularly when 
matters of moment for the community are involved."27 This was clearly a message 
that many wanted to hear. If biology is necessary - "sex differences are perforce 
related to male bonding and ... male bonding is related to breeding advantagewz8 - we 
may as well sit back and enjoy. 
1987); Joan Scott, Gender and the Politics of History (New York 1988); Judith Butler, Gender 
Trouble: feminism and the subversion of identify (New York and London 1989); Linda Nicholson 
(ed.), Feminism~Postmodernism 
27 Lionel Tiger, Men in Groups (New York 1%9), 75. 
28 Ibid., 46. 
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Ideas like Tiger's which attempt to explain gendered social practices in terms of 
biological differences -part of the whole field of sociobiology - tend to be used 
to confirm rather than question the socio-historical relations between the sexes. As a 
result, feminists have tended to reject not only the specific findings of sociobiology 
but the whole field of inquiry.29 Sociobiologist Sarah Hrdy has argued that this is 
short-sighted and that there is a great deal to be learned about the evolution of human 
society from sociobiology." Sociobiology is not inherently 'sexist,' she argues; rather 
its practitioners have been sexist. When the evolution of the female differs from the 
evolution of the male, the female is treated as an irrelevant deviation from the norm. 
A good example, Hrdy argues, is the female potential to be multi-orgasmic. 
Sociobiologists have regarded this as an 'aberration,' with no importance for the 
survival of the species. Hrdy argues that if they took their own precepts seriously - 
that there are no genuine flukes - they would have had to explore the reasons for 
this adaptation. Without going into her particular explanations, what is germane here 
is her argument that the female of the species has also evolved in a way to maximize 
her survival and the survival of her children. This has involved the development of 
competition as an adaptation to environment. Males, she demonstrates, have no 
genetic monopoly on competitive forms of behaviour. 
Feminist archaeologists and anthropologists have been in a good position to argue 
that the usual assumptions of sociobiology are the assumptions of an ideology of male 
supremacy. By approaching societies with a set of critical questions about the 
distribution of resources, the relations of power and the division of labour, feminists 
have discovered that in many human societies women provide, in one way or another, 
most of the food necessary for the survival of themselves, the men and their children. 
They were not as impressed as earlier observers that men hunted and occasionally 
brought back the slaughtered animals for meat - particularly when hunting might 
supply as little as ten per cent of that society's food supply. Meanwhile, the women 
and older children were gathering, and perhaps planting and cultivating, the food that 
supplied the rest. Furthermore, they noticed that the women often worked together 
to do this, developing cooperative strategies in order to care for children, provide the 
necessities of life, and create a material and social culture. Recently, some anthro- 
pologists have also speculated that men did not even have the monopoly on hunting. 
The differences in physical size between men and women and the surmised 
differences in genetic aptitude for bonding have not impressed feminist researchers 
trying to explain the near-universality of sexual hierarchies. But there is another set 
of biological differences that feminists have taken more seriously in their quest for 
explanations: namely, those differences related to the reproduction of the species. 
The Sexual Division of Reproductive Labour 
Women do almost all reproductive work; indeed men's role has been necessary, but 
so invisible that uncovering their participation was a rather late development in 
human history. That our early ancestors managed to link two events - conception 
and birth -which come nine months apart, and are of such different order - is quite 
mind-boggling. Most children - quite sensibly - do not believe it when they are 
first told. 
29 Ruth Hubbard, "The Political Nature of 'Human Nature"' in Deborah L. Rhode (ed.), Theoretical 
Perspectives on Sexual Differences (New Haven 1990). 
30 Sarah Hrdy, The Woman Who Never Evolved (Cambridge 1981), 198. 
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The link between women, pregnancy, child-birth and lactation has meant that if 
women do not do the reproductive labour, it will not be done. These reproductive 
differences have underwritten an assumption that this natural division of reproductive 
labour has an autonomous life of its own, impervious to the social environment in 
which it occurs. Further, these differences have provided a point of departure for 
arguing that the hierarchical relations between men and women derive from this 
division of labour. There are several major problems with the two-pronged leap which 
take us first from 'women have the babies' to 'and therefore women's lives are 
grounded in nature's imperatives,' and from there to 'and therefore women are 
destined to be subordinate to men.' 
First, having babies is not a purely 'natural' activity. Women have the babies. But 
although only women can have babies, they do not always choose to do so. Through- 
out the ages women have tried to control their fertility, and often these attempts were 
thwarted through religious teachings, law, and the suppression of inf~rmation.~~ In 
Canada it was illegal, until 1969, for doctors to provide their patients with birth control 
information and for pharmacists to sell contraceptive devices.32 Quebec's recent 
programs include financial 'incentives' for parents for each child that they have. The 
historical record -particularly in France which has a long record of providing such 
inducements - indicates that if women have their price it is more than any govern- 
ment has yet been prepared to offer. Clearly, women cannot always be counted upon 
to produce the number of children those in power wish them to produce.33 Women 
have remained celibate for life or for periods of time; they have loved women rather 
than men; they have developed and practiced methods of birth control; they have 
self-aborted or sought help from others. African women, on board galley ships en 
route to America as slaves, are known to have killed their new-borns rather than have 
them live the lives to which they were destined. 
Second, while some women have refused to bear or suckle children or have been 
coerced or persuaded to do so, others have been encouraged or forced not to 
reproduce. State regulations have sometimes stipulated that women must be sterilized 
before qualifying for social welfare; third-world women have been treated like 
laboratory animals by first-world pharmaceutical companies engaged in contracep- 
tive research. Also, infanticide has been a widespread practice in many societies; we 
know little about how women felt about this, but what we do know suggests that there 
is always a level of economic or political coercion. 
Third, the assumption of 'naturalness' neglects the enormous variations in the 
conditions under which women in different historical periods, cultures and social 
classes have children." Sometimes the economic and political organization of the 
society facilitates their reproductive work; other times there are enormous obstacles. 
In most cases, no special privileges greet pregnant women; if they are living in 
destitution, they will bear their children in destitution; if they live in countries at war, 
they will remain at risk; if they are subject to racist ideologies and practices, 
pregnancy will not alleviate them. In Canadian society, pregnancy was considered 
31 Linda Gordon, Woman's Body, Woman's Right A Social History of Birth Control in America (New 
York 1976). 
32 Angus McLaren and Arlene Tigar McLaren, The Bedrom and the State: The Changing Practices 
andpolitics of Contraception andAbortion in Canada, 1880-1980 (Toronto 1986). 
33 Jill Vickers, "At his mother's knee: SedGender and the Construction of National Identities," in Greta 
Hofman Nemiroff (ed.), Women and Men (Toronto 1987). 
34 Pat Armstrong and Hugh Armstrong, "Beyond Sexless Class and Classless Sex: Towards Feminist 
Marxism," in The Politics of Diversity. 
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sufficient grounds for dismissal from paid employment until recently and, even now, 
these social practices die hard. 
Fourth, there has been a related assumption that reproductive labour, stemming as 
it did from the 'natural' division of reproductive labour, was also 'natural.' This 
assumption served to link women more with the animal kingdom than with the 
productive labour of (primarily male),human beings. Mary O'Brien was the first to 
argue systematically that although women whocarry their infants to term, do not have 
a choice about engaging in reproductive labour, this does not mean that they do not 
actively and consciously engage in this labour. Through this labour, women mediate 
their relationship with their children, and more generally between the generations and 
continued life on the planet. Reproductive labour is then human labour, actively 
entered into, and like productive labour, shapes the consciousness of women so 
engaged.31 
Fifth, although the link between women and childbearing was produced by nature, 
the link between women and childcare (outside of lactation) is humanly created. Men 
may actually do very little of the world's nurturing work. But their biology is not the 
reason; rather their biology has been invoked as rationale for this lack of participation. 
Enough men have done enough of this work to indicate that their relative absence 
from this line-of-work is not a result of genetic programming. 
Sixth, the link between child-bearing and female subordination is clearly an 
invention - a highly ingenious invention -developed in most, though perhaps not 
all, human societies.32 That the forms of female subordination are neither universal 
nor uniform constitute sufficient grounds for believing that the hierarchical relations 
between men and women are socially constructed. But even those feminists who insist 
most strenuously that women have always been subordinate and that the roots of this 
subordination are to be found in the division of reproductive labour, argue that this 
does not mean that women must remain subordinate. In The Dialectic of Sex, 
Shulamith Firestone argued that women's subordination, stemming from nature's 
unequal allotment of reproductive tasks, was universal. But, in her words, "...to grant 
that the sexual balance of power is biologically based is not to lose our case. We are 
no longer just animals. And the Kingdom of Nature does not reign absolute."33 
It is difficult to avoid concluding that the sexual division of reproductive labour 
has made it possible, though not necessary, for men in many different kinds of 
societies to dominate and control women and their children. Indeed, the organization 
of contemporary Canadian society ensures that women who bear children will be at 
economic, political and social disadvantage compared to the men of their social class, 
ethnic group, age etc. But as this discussion of the sexual division of reproductive 
labour indicates, this hierarchy is not our 'natural' inheritance but rather is socially 
and historically constructed in ways that need to be explored in each situation.34 I am 
persuaded, however, that if we are to understand the subordination of women 
historically and cross-culturally, and understand why women have not resisted that 
subordination more massively, we must take into account the sexual division of 
reproductive labour. It has mkant that women are dependent upon men for at least 
part of their adult lives, and that men have had more freedom - namely time and 
energy - to consolidate their power over women. 
31 Mary O'Brien, The Politics of Reproduction (London 1981). 
32 Kathleen Gough, The Origin of the Family (Toronto 1970). 
33 Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex, 10. 
34 Parr, The Gender ofBreadwinners. 
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This question of the 'origins' of the gender hierarchy and the role of the sexual 
division of labour is, I believe, necessary for understanding what French historians 
have called la longue duree - and also the pervasiveness of gender hierarchies. But 
if that were the end of the story we would have no way of explaining the countless 
variations in the sexual hierarchies, nor how and why women came to resist. Entering 
this discussion requires a brief diversion into the more general question of how those 
in power retain - and eventually may lose - their power. This question hinges on 
the ability of the dominant to convince the dominated that the power relations 
between them are legitimate, even natural. 
Legitimating Power, Challenging Power 
Just as the kings of the Middle Ages, and the aristocrats who lived off the court, 
propagated the idea of 'the divine right of kings,' so men have insisted that their power 
is naturally or divinely ordained. Dominant groups do not willingly give up their 
prerogatives. About this much at least the historical record is rather clear. There may 
be a bit of cross-dressing: Friedrich Engels Sr. owned factories; yet his son co- 
authored the Communist Manifesto with Karl Marx. There is evidence of some 
cross-class solidarity in the feminist movements. Some men have allied themselves 
with feminist struggles, even in the early part of this century when it was a far less 
popular cause. Yet such exceptions serve to throw that which is usually taken for 
granted into relief: that the ideas developed, believed and perpetrated by dominant 
groups legitimate their power. These ideas explain the relations of power and the 
distribution of resources in the society in ways that make them appear eminently 
reasonable and correct - not just to those whose interests they protect, but to those 
who are oppressed and exploited by them. 
There is nothing necessarily conspiratorial about this. We all develop explanations 
for what we are doing that try to make sense of our behaviour and to justify our 
actions. But we all do not have the same opportunity to disseminate our ideas, to 
persuade others, and to pass laws which help produce the outcomes we wish. For 
example, the elites in the feudal world were well-served by the teachings of the 
Roman Catholic Church: kings and peasants alike were encouraged to accept their 
worldly conditions and to anticipate retribution or compensation in the afterlife. 
These teachings, drawn selectively from the Old and New Testament, probably 
encouraged the rich to be charitable towards the poor, and the poor to resign 
themselves to their fate. Peasants resisted increased impositions by church, state or 
lords. But they seldom attacked the whole edifice, and when they did the results were 
bloody. 
The ideas of the dominant class or the elites are accepted, in large part, because 
they appear to describe everyday reality. Those in power are more articulate by the 
very standards that they are in a position to create, define and enforce - for example, 
the notion of 'good' English. They do have more 'formal' education, and they do own 
most of the wealth. Dominant groups, then, tend to have a monopoly not just on 
societal resources and the means to attain and retain them, but also on the develop- 
ment and dissemination of ideas. 
Challenges to dominant ideas do not come out of the air; they make their entrance 
onto the world stage with groups of people whose life activities and relationships are 
changing, changing in ways which bring their needs and desires into conflict with the 
dominant social practices and ideas of the time.39 All this happens in a most uneven 
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sort of way. The power to effect change is highly variable; laws need to be enforced, 
not just made. The language encountered from the past and the meaning given to 
words must be renegotiated?' In aristocratic society, for example, the word 'work' 
was pejorative; it implied that a man had insufficient income to live a life of ease and 
had to turn to trade or manual labour. Over time the word 'work' was redefined by 
the developing bourgeoisie. Work became a sign of virtue and worth; those who did 
not work, did not deserve to eat. What is key here is that challenges to established 
authority and power occur, and in this process great transformations can be wrought. 
Exploring how and why women resist deprivation and oppression has intrigued 
feminist scholars from different theoretical and disciplinary perspectives. What I 
want to do here is provide a brief reminder - an argument really - that feminist 
theories developed within social movements, that they made their way into the 
academy through direct and circuitous ways, and that their presence there today 
continues to depend on their interconnections with emancipatory social movements. 
Feminist Movements, Feminist Theories, and the Academy 
During the 1970s the women's movement - in all its incarnations -challenged the 
relations of domination and subordination between men and women in every aspect 
of life. What perplexed many, especially those in the media who had to 'cover' the 
story, was that this was, for the most part, a movement with no organization, no 
leadership, and no centre. Indeed, in 1976 The Star Weekly Magazine ran a cover 
story with a cross and wreath declaring that 'the women's movement is dead'! This 
was to the considerable surprise of the ever-increasing numbers of women who were 
referring to themselves as feminists. At the same time, even more women were 
overheard saying, "I'm not a feminist but ...." And the number of 'buts' began to 
multiply as women from all walks of life began to tell their stories, to seek support 
from other women, to start women centres, to raise funds for shelters for women 
physically abused by their 'loved' ones and rape crisis centres for women violated 
by strangers and 'friends.' Whole areas of life were uncloseted, labelled, interpreted, 
and made the subject of countless newspaper stories. Who had ever heard of a 
'battered woman' before the 1970s? A date rape? Even a botched abortion? These 
were experiences that women had endured in private, most often blaming themselves, 
thus compounding their hurt with guilt and shame. 
This second wave of feminism was remarkable in many ways: the sheer numbers 
of women who shaped its ever-expanding 'agenda'; the links that were drawn 
between aspects of life once considered discrete - economic life and the family, 
private and public, work and home, love and brutality; the interconnections between 
the feminist movement and movements for lesbian and gay liberation, peace, ecology, 
and against racism; its development as women's studies within the academy; and 
from the vantage point of 1990, its longevity. Indeed, of all the social movements of 
the 1960s, the women's movement, however diversified it became, however its 
strategies were adapted to new circumstances, continued to grow in countries 
throughout the world. 
These movements were political but they were also, and intrinsically, theoretical 
challenges to the relations of domination and subordination between men and women. 
Feminist activists argued that these relations are socially constructed rather than being 
39 Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford 1977) and Culture (London 1981). 
40 Raymond Williams, Keywords (London 1976). 
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ordained by nature or God. An important aspect of feminist theory has been, as we 
saw in the section on 'origins,' to seek explanations for women's subordination, the 
ways in which their subordination is maintained, and the ways in which they have 
tried to resist the consequences of their inferior status. This question of resistance is 
of great importance. For feminist theories themselves are products, manifestations, 
and tools of that resistance. They developed within the feminist movements: the 
fledgling movement that developed during the French Revolution; the widespread 
movement that was initiated in 1848 at Seneca Falls and culminated with the granting 
of female suffrage; and the contemporary feminist movement that began in the 1960s 
in the United States. Women's Studies developed from the contemporary women's 
movement and has been called its academic arm. Many feminists believe that unless 
it retains its organic and political links with that movement, women's studies will 
lose its critical edge, its power to probe behind appearances, and its potential to 
transform society. 
A History of Women's Studies 
This discussion provides a more general context to look at our more particular 
question: how did women come to question their subordinate position and to chal- 
lenge the power that men have in their lives, whether as politicians, employers, 
fathers, husbands - or as gatekeepers in academia. This is an enormously complex 
historical question. In their attempts to answer it, feminists have had to study the 
specific countries and time periods in which such challenges developed; they have 
looked at all aspects of life from the macro-economic to the small details of intimate 
life; and they have drawn on the insights of many disciplines, all the while challenging 
these disciplines themselves. 
In the last fifteen years Women's Studies courses and programs have developed 
within the university. It is not clear why these new programs carry the name women's 
studies rather than feminist studies. In trying to clarify this we launch ourselves, once 
again, onto controversial theoretical terrain. 
The first feminist forays into redrawing the intellectual map involved redressing 
the balance of scholarship by studying and writing about women. In a sense, then, 
the map became larger, but what was already there remained more or less the same. 
Feminists added books on famous women to the enormous collection of books on 
famous men; they researched what women had been doing while men had been 
making war and peace and then war again; they explored women's sexuality for itself 
and not as a complement and compliment to male sexuality. As part of a challenge 
to Freudian formulations on female sexuality, the psychoanalyst, Mary Jane Sherfey, 
wrote that women could have fifty or more orgasms in an hour's time?' If that seemed 
formidable, it was a challenging response to the accepted view that the ratio of male 
to female orgasms could only be one-to-one, since real women only responded to real 
sex, namely sexual intercourse. 
In a sense, then, women's studies took its name during this compensatory period. 
If all knowledge to date had been men's studies, and that seemed the case, women's 
studies would complete the other half of the picture. But from the beginning this was 
not all that the new feminist scholars were doing. Feminists were challenging the 
power that men had over women - economic, political, and social power, the power 
41 "On the Nature of Female Sexuality" in Jean Baker Miller (ed.), Psychoanalysis and Women 
(Harmondsworth, England 1972), 138. 
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that kept women out of the literary canon and denied them artistic recognition. It was 
impossible, therefore, to study women apart from the relationships which structure 
their lives; it is impossible to study women without studying men. 
The late feminist historian Joan Kelly put this well. When we come to evaluate 
the position of women at any point in history, we must look at the relation between 
men and women.42 In other words, if we argued that women were oppressed in 
Canada, and took as evidence the statistics on income which showed that a high 
percentage of women lived below the current poverty line as set by Statistics Canada, 
for example, and we knew nothing else we could shake our head in despair, but we 
would know nothing about the relationship between women and poverty. If the 
statistics indicated, however, that a much higher percentage of women than men in 
Canada lived below that same poverty line, we have some evidence that being female 
constitutes an economic disadvantage in the society relative to men. But the statistics 
alone tell us nothing about how this comes to be: how the relationship between 'being 
female' and 'being poor' is mediated. As we pursue these questions we again must 
ask about the relation between men and women in order to explain how this happens. 
This is what Pat and Hugh Armstrong did in their path-breaking work The Double 
Ghetto. The questions took them both into the labour force and into the home - how 
was it that women came to do the lion's share of domestic labour and childcare and 
hold a disproportionate share of the low-paid jobs in the labour force? Again, the 
questions always raise explicit and implicit comparisons between the lives of women 
and the lives of men. How do men come by and maintain their power over women? 
How is it possible for motherhood to be so valorized, on the one hand, and so badly 
rewarded on the other? Why are women, in Patricia Connelly's words "Last Hired, 
First Fired"?43 And when we probe all these questions which lead us to into areas 
once never discussed - into the underside of intimate life, into the ways in which 
men do exert power over women, into sexual and psychological harassment, wife 
battering and rape, into the apparent unwillingness of men to accept women as equals 
at work, we are still asking questions about a relation. Men are seldom absent from 
these discussions, though at times their presence may be shadowy rather than explicit. 
We must conclude, I think, that 'women's studies,' for all the positive connotations 
it has for those of us who have struggled for its inclusion in the academy, is, in fact, 
too limited a title for all that happens under its rubric. For it is impossible to study 
women without studying men; indeed what we are studying is a relation - a relation 
of power; what we are studying is aprocess - a process through which ideas about 
masculinity and femininity are constructed, continuously in time and space, and in 
relation to each other. What we are studying is the process of constructing sexual 
identities and sexual preferences and how and why some carry social acceptability 
and others social stigma. Much of this we only know because some people have taken 
the risks of living openly against the ideological grain of their whole society. 
This necessarily involves us in a massive critique of existing society - its 
relationships, institutions, and ideologies. The tools for this endeavour are the 
questions raised by feminist theories, indeed by all theories that call the current 
distribution of power and privilege into question. Feminists have refashioned marx- 
ism in their attempts to understand the relation between class and gender; feminists 
of colour have insisted that white feminists undertake the difficult intellectual and 
42 Joan Kelly, Women, History and Theory: The Essays of Joan Kelly (Chicago 1984). 
43 Patricia Connelly, Lasr Hired: First Fired (Toronto 1978). 
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emotional task of acknowledging and dismantling their own racism; psychoanalytic 
theories have been reread for what they might tell us about power, control, misogyny 
and internalized oppression; lesbians and gays have put the oppressive system of 
compulsory heterosexuality on the agenda, and related this system to male privilege, 
racial stereotypes, and class exploitation. Feminists have been drawn to the newer 
theories of ~ost-structuralism and deconstructionism and turned them into ~owerful 
ways of examining both how language creates, sustains and constrains our sense of 
who we are and, at the same time, how language, by its volatility and flexibility, may 
open up the spaces for oppositional discourses and resistance. 
In this quest no body of literature, no institution has remained untouched. The 
literary canons of Western civilization have been reread, no longer just as 'great 
literature' but as specific renditions of the relations between men and women, 
elaborate maps of patriarchal culture, and for insight into the ways in which women 
speak, acquiesce and resist. The writings of women have been resurrected, repub- 
lished or printed for the first time. Historically, women have written much more than 
we believed twenty years ago; everything from their diaries and notebooks through 
to novels and poetry are scanned for their aesthetic contribution and for the insights 
they provide into the lives of women, once unknown. 
Feminist scholarship precedes from an understanding that 'knowledge' is not 
prepackaged; knowledge is never simply a given. On the contrary, what passes for 
knowledge is always historically specific, and communicated by - insisted upon 
through - language. Indeed, there is widespread agreement that language is part and 
parcel of that knowledge, inextricably linked with its creation. 
For example, think of the idea of 'good' English. Who speaks 'good' English, and 
who has the opportunity to define this English as 'good'? Good English becomes part 
and parcel of the introduction to society of some children and not others; children not 
so initiated will have to learn 'good' English at school as something like an unknown 
object. For those who are initiated from birth it will be an intrinsic aspect of their 
identity, and unbeknownst to them will privilege them in relationship to others. 
In like-minded fashion feminists have challenged what passes for knowledge, and 
have argued that men of the elites have had privileged access to creating knowledge 
-that is, to creating those descriptions, 'information' and interpretations of the world 
that are deemed important for educated people to know. Simultaneously this means 
that they also have the power of omission -to leave what is not considered important 
outside-the canon of knowledge. These omissions constitute the corollary of knowl- 
edge - that which is too irrelevant to formulate, to pass on, or to explain. Feminists 
of all persuasions have been filling in what has been left out, filling in the silences. 
But in so doing, they also depose that which was already there from its privileged 
location as 'knowledge.' For they call into question the methods through which that 
'knowledge' has been created and privileged. How can the great events of human 
history exclude the reproductive labour of women? Why are some paintings hung in 
@leries, and others left in people's private bedrooms? Why is the conversation of 
men often defined as weighty and profound, the conversation of women as gossip 
and idle chatter? Why are women enjoined to be chaste (by means subtle and cruel) 
while men are presumed to require 'experience'? 
Feminist theories offer to make visible, analyze and critique the hierarchical social 
relations between men and women in all societies, and in every aspect of society from 
the level of macro-economics and international politics through to sexuality and the 
intimate social practices of everyday life. They offer to expose the socially con- 
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structed nature of those relations and to try and explain how they are sustained at the 
intra-psychic and inter-subjective levels. There is always an explicit or at least 
implicit critique offered of these relations of domination and subordination. If 
feminist theories can explain why and how things are as they are, they also provide 
explicitly or implicitly the possibility of transformation, societies no longer informed 
by exploitative and oppressive relations between the sexes. 
In writing this paper, I proceed from the position that there are many ways of 
'knowing,' none of them final and incontestable. In many ways, it seems to me, the 
different theories, on what we can know and how, serve as constraints on each other. 
That is, they serve to keep us in a critical mode, an undogmatic frame-of-mind that 
keeps us asking the questions about women, men, and the relationships between and 
among them, that have been so many millennia in coming. 
